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金融数据治理是金融数字化转型与金融强国建设的核心命题。金融作为数据相关立法与监管最完备的行业,实践中却成为各类数据风险的“重灾区”。治理低效的症结在于各参与主体间治理责任配置的不均衡,金融机构承担过多主体治理责任,却缺乏相应的法律制度激励其充分履行。与传统责任制度相比,安全港允许金融机构通过遵守特定的合规行为换取有限的免责保护,起到重新分配主体治理责任作用,对于化解金融数据治理困境具有独特制度优势。然而,金融数据治理法律关系呈现多代理人并存、委托人深度参与、代理人高风险偏好的特点,现行其他领域安全港的激励机制并不完全适用于本领域。应采取“比例分成型”激励机制,赋予金融机构安全港规则制定权,引入公正且有效的业绩监督信号,设计适配各类金融数据处理场景的安全港准入制度,完善贯穿安全港设立和履行全过程的有效性评估机制,构建激励相容的金融数据治理安全港,以制度创新突破新金融业态治理困境,开拓数字金融法治的激励性维度。
Abstract:Financial data governance constitutes the core proposition in the digital transformation of finance and the construction of a major financial power.Despite being an industry with the most comprehensive data-related legislation and supervision, the financial sector has, in practice, become a “hard-hit area” for various data risks.The crux of inefficient governance lies in the imbalance in the allocation of governance responsibilities among various participating entities.Financial institutions undertake excessive governance responsibilities for the main body, yet lack corresponding legal systems to motivate them to fulfill these responsibilities fully.In contrast to traditional liability systems, a safe harbor enables financial institutions to obtain limited liability protection by adhering to specific compliance behaviors, thereby redistributing the governance responsibilities of the main body and presenting unique institutional advantages in addressing the predicament of financial data governance.Nevertheless, the legal relationship in financial data governance exhibits characteristics such as the coexistence of multiple agents, deep involvement of principals, and high-risk preferences of agents.The incentive mechanisms of the safe harbor in other existing fields are not fully applicable in this domain.An “incentive mechanism of proportional sharing” should be adopted, conferring on financial institutions the authority to formulate safe harbor rules, introducing impartial and effective performance monitoring signals, designing a safe harbor access regime tailored to diverse financial data processing scenarios, perfecting the effectiveness evaluation mechanism throughout the entire process of the establishment and performance of the safe harbor, and constructing an incentive-compatible safe harbor for financial data governance.The goal is to break through the governance predicament of new financial business forms through institutional innovation and pioneer an incentive-based dimension of digital finance rule of law.
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基本信息:
DOI:10.19331/j.cnki.jxufe.20250724.001
中图分类号:F832;F49;D922.28;D922.16
引用信息:
[1]袁瑞璟,岳彩申.金融数据治理的安全港制度激励研究[J].西安财经大学学报,2026,39(01):80-90.DOI:10.19331/j.cnki.jxufe.20250724.001.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金重点项目“互联网个人信贷法律问题研究”(20AZD117); 重庆市教委人文社会科学研究重点项目“数据收益分配的激励性法律制度研究”(23SKJD020); 西南政法大学2024年度学生科研创新项目“人工智能风险治理中安全港制度的创新应用研究”